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 Abstract 
The paper introduces the three articles in this Policy Feature, concerned 
respectively with competition, corporate governance and selection in emerging 
markets.  Apart from being important in their own right, it is shown how these 
topics have recently acquired urgent domestic and international policy 
significance.  This overview also provides the intellectual background to the 
issues raised in the papers and examines their interrelationships in analytical, 
empirical and methodological terms.  It outlines a research programme which 
would not only have direct policy relevance for both emerging and mature 
countries, but would also have broader analytical significance for many areas of 
economic theory. 
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i 1. Introduction: The Domestic and International Policy Context 
As the title indicates, the three papers in this Policy Feature are concerned 
respectively with competition, corporate governance and selection in emerging 
markets. These topics are not only analytically and empirically important in 
their own right, but for the reasons outlined below they have also acquired in 
the recent period urgent domestic as well as international policy significance. 
The international prominence of these issues stems from the Asian crisis which 
during 1997-1999 devastated some of the world's fastest growing economies. 
This extremely sharp and unexpected downturn focused attention on the micro-
economic behaviour of economic agents in the affected countries. Soon after it 
began, an influential view of the crisis emerged especially in policy-making 
circles. It asserted that, although macro-economic disequilibria might have 
provided a trigger for the economic reversal, the deeper underlying causes were 
structural and lay in the normal day-to-day interactions of corporations, banks 
and the government in these countries.
1, 
2 Thus, according to this analysis, the 
Asian crisis was a tragedy waiting to happen; its roots lay in the ‘Asian way of 
doing business’. This account of the crisis emphasized particularly the 
deficiencies in (a) the prudential regulation of the financial sector, (b) the 
nature and degree of product market competition, and (c) the quality of 
corporate governance in emerging countries as the fundamental structural 
reasons for their economic misfortune. 
 
Very briefly, the structural thesis suggests that the Asian crisis was in part 
caused by over-investment which in turn resulted from a poor competitive 
environment and disregard for profits in corporate investment decisions (owing 
to unsatisfactory governance mechanisms). It is further argued that the close 
relationship between government, business and finance, typical in these 
economies, led to high debt-equity ratios in the corporate sector. High gearing 
made the corporate sector financially fragile and vulnerable to interest rate and 
exchange rate (in the case of external corporate debt) shocks. Thus, over-
investment was a consequence of crony capitalism and the lack of product 
market discipline. Excessive investment reduced profits and ultimately led to 
the crisis because of a financial system made fragile by relationship banking 
and a corporate sector which was vulnerable due to its high leverage. 
 
Although as an explanation for the Asian crisis the structural theory is by no 
means adequate or accepted by most economists
3, it has nevertheless helped 
concentrate minds on the nature of industrial structure and corporate 
organization in emerging countries. Quite apart from the crisis and its 
international dimensions, this emphasis was also required by important changes 
in the domestic economies of developing countries. Many of them undertook 
 market-oriented economic reforms in the 1980s and 1990s. They implemented 
widespread privatization, liberalized their economies as well as encouraged the 
establishment of, or greatly expanded market institutions such as the stock 
market
4. These measures led to a significant growth of the private sector 
relative to that of the public sector. In that context, questions of competition, 
corporate governance, corporate finance and organization naturally acquired 
domestic policy importance. What the Asian crisis as well as the frequent crises 
in other emerging markets in the 1990s did was to bring these issues to the 
international agenda. The growing significance of emerging markets in the 
world economy, and the possibility of spill-over effects from the crises of these 
economies on to the global economy, led to calls in the late 1990s for a New 
International Financial Architecture. The latter suggests inter alia corporate 
governance and product market competition as important areas of reform to 
forestall future crises in these economies
5. Corporate governance and 
competition are therefore today salient policy concerns at both national and 
international levels. 
 
Although there exists considerable research on these subjects for advanced 
economies (ACs), there has until recently been very little work in these areas 
for developing countries (DCs)
6. One silver lining of the Asian financial crises 
has been that international financial organizations have allocated more 
resources to research on these issues for emerging markets. Consequently there 
is much more primary data available now on corporate ownership patterns, 
corporate organization and finance, competition and competition policy than 
was the case before the financial crisis.
7 There have also been some important 
recent contributions on these issues by academic economists as well as policy 
makers
8. The collection of papers in this Policy Feature is intended to further 
extend research on these topics. 
 
The first paper by Glen, Lee and Singh (2002) provides time series analyses of 
corporate profitability at the individual firm level in seven leading DCs and 
considers their implications for product market competition in these economies. 
It uses the uniform methodology of persistence of profitability (PP) studies to 
examine issues of the dynamics of the competition process. The DC results are 
systematically compared with the exactly corresponding results for advanced 
countries using the same methodology. The comparison yields surprising 
counter-intuitive findings; these suggest that on the normal interpretation of  
the observed persistency coefficients, the intensity of competition in DCs is no 
less, but probably greater, than that observed in ACs. An important part of the 
paper is concerned with a) confirming the statistical robustness for this 
anomalous finding, b) explaining it in economic terms, and c) examining the 
 broader issues of the interpretation of the parameters of the auto-regressive 
equation used in such exercises. The authors also report on time-series analyses 
of the two components of profitability, namely capital-output ratios and profit 
margins. Such analyses have not been carried out before for either developed or 
developing countries. The results in these cases also raise important general 
issues of economic interpretation for PP studies. 
 
The second paper by Gugler, Mueller and Yurtoglu (2002) is concerned with 
issues of corporate governance in developed and developing countries. Using 
the huge Global Vantage data base and the methodology pioneered by Mueller 
and Reardon (1993), and developed further in Mueller and Yurtoglu (2000), the 
authors investigate efficiency of corporate investments from different sources 
of finance essentially in terms of "marginal Tobin's qs".  This methodology 
turns out to be very fruitful as it enables the authors to help resolve several 
notable anomalies in the financing of corporations as well as with respect to 
rates of return to different sources of finance in both emerging and mature 
markets. Further, while other economists have sought to explain the differences 
in economic performance between AC and DC firms in terms of the legal 
system, basic legal philosophy and corporate laws of the country,
9 Gugler, 
Mueller and Yurtoglu find that corporate governance institutions are a more 
important as well as more appropriate explanatory variable in accounting for 
inter-country differences in the rates of return. The nature and context of some 
these anomalies which this paper helps resolve will be elaborated in the next 
section. 
 
The third paper by Aw, Chung and Roberts (2002) uses another methodology, 
that of turnover and mobility studies to examine competition and selection in 
two leading emerging markets, South Korea and Taiwan. The authors use 
microeconomic census data for seven comparable industries in the two 
countries to study these issues. They suggest that essentially because of higher 
'sunk' costs of entry in Korea relative to Taiwan, the industrial structure in the 
former country is much less dynamic than that of Taiwan. Specifically, the 
authors show that compared with Taiwan, in Korea, the market structure is 
more concentrated, there is less producer turnover, greater 'within industry' 
cross-section productivity dispersion, a greater percentage of production units 
operating at low productivity levels and larger productivity differentials 
between survivors and failing firms. The authors also compare their results with 
those observed for the US and conclude that the pressures of product market 
competition are stronger in Taiwan than in the USA, whereas the competition 
forces in the latter country would appear to be more powerful than in Korea. 
 
 The previous discussion has indicated how the microeconomic issues of 
corporate governance, competition and selection - each of which individually 
are the subject of a separate paper in this Policy Feature - are related to current 
domestic and international policy concerns.  All three papers take a 
comparative stance and where possible provide comparable information for 
DCs and ACs. While apparently using different methodologies each paper 
makes original contributions to the relevant literature. However as these 
contributions are included in more precise form in each of the respective 
papers, for reasons of space they will not be repeated here. To supplement the 
above examination of the policy questions, the following sections will outline 
some of the analytical and empirical connections between the three papers and 
thereby provide an essential background and the intellectual context for the 
issues examined in them. It will be seen that the papers and their respective 
topics intersect with each other in various ways at a number of different levels. 
 
II. Competition, Corporate Governance and Selection: Analytical and 
Empirical  Links 
Seminal contributions of nearly fifty years ago by Alchian (1950) and Friedman 
(1953) indicated a close relationship between competition, selection and 
corporate governance. These studies suggested that regardless of the separation 
between ownership and control of the kind documented by Berle and Means 
(1933) for the US economy, the competitive selection process in the product 
markets would ensure that managers are obliged to maximize profits.  A 
corollary of this analysis was that only the optimal ownership patterns and 
corporate governance structures would survive this 'natural selection' 
mechanism. A careful examination of this claim by Winter (1964) indicated, 
however, that it was not valid in all states of the world, but only under rather 
limited conditions of perfect competition and unfettered entry. Specifically, 
Winters’ modelling of the selection mechanism suggested that if there were 
imperfect competition, barriers to entry and/or economies of scale, different 
corporate governance systems could co-exist and managers of large 
corporations would not need to maximize profits in order to survive. 
10 
 
These findings shifted the argument to the capital market and to the market for 
corporate control. Early contributions by Alchian and Kessel (1962) and Manne 
(1965) suggested that notwithstanding the degree of competition in product 
markets, perfect competition in the capital market and in the market for 
corporate control would resolve Berle and Means's agency problem by forcing 
managers to maximize share-holders’ wealth. Even if the product markets were 
wholly monopolized, those firms which did not maximize monopoly profits and 
preferred say, the easy life, would become takeover targets for those who were 
 willing to do so. The latter would potentially have higher share prices on the 
stock market than the former, providing an opportunity and an incentive for a 
takeover to occur. Thus the selection process, this time in the capital market, 
would again ensure inter alia optimum governance structures.
11 
 
Subsequent research has indicated that for a number of theoretical as well as 
practical reasons - asymmetric information, transactions costs, Grossman and 
Hart’s (1980) free rider problem, capital market imperfections - the takeover 
mechanism on the capital market may not be adequate for the task of resolving 
agency questions in the modern corporate economy. Further, empirical 
evidence for the advanced economies of the US and the UK
12 indicates that 
selection in the market for corporate control does not take place entirely on the 
basis of efficiency, that is, profitability or stock market valuation. Although 
profitability matters, absolute size matters more. A large, relatively unprofitable 
company has a much better chance of survival than a small profitable one. 
Moreover, almost invariably it is large firms that take over the small. Indeed, 
the acquisition process may operate in a perverse way since a large unprofitable 
company can increase its immunity to takeovers through the takeover process 
itself - by becoming larger through the acquisition of small firms
13. 
 
Most developing countries do not yet have an active market for corporate 
control in the Anglo-Saxon sense. Some of them, for example India and Brazil, 
have embryonic markets which may soon mature.  However, these markets are 
likely to be even more imperfect and suffer from informational deficits than 
markets in the US and the UK. For these and other reasons, Singh (1998a) 
argues that such markets are unlikely to provide a satisfactory solution to the 
corporate governance issues in developing countries. 
 
In view of these difficulties with the market for corporate control, the wheel has 
come almost the full circle in advanced economies. It has been suggested that it 
is the severe product market competition in a liberalized global economy which 
is more likely to constrain corporate managers in the pursuit of their own 
objectives at the expense of the firm's shareholders rather than the capital 
markets.
14 Such competition however is likely to be oligopolistic and of non-
price variety, which may not have the welfare enhancing properties of textbook 
price competition.  Be that as it may, neo-classical economists now agree that, 
because of the many imperfections in the product markets and in the market for 
corporate control, there is indeed a governance problem in the modern 
corporation. This is usually modeled in the form of a principal-agent problem in 
which the separation of ownership and control imposes agency costs on the 
corporation's shareholders. This cost is assumed to vary inversely with the 
 intensity of competition in the product markets and with the efficiency of the 
selection process in the capital markets, Jensen and Meckling (1976); Jensen 
(1986). 
 
III. Corporate Governance and Corporate Finance in Emerging Markets:  
Some Anomalies 
Further insights into the nature of the corporate governance problems in DCs 
are provided by examining the relationship between corporate finance and 
corporate governance in these countries. The two are closely related almost by 
definition. As Schleifer and Vishny (1997) note in their comprehensive review 
article on the subject:  “Corporate governance deals with the ways in which 
suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on 
their investment’.  The two authors suggest that the central issue of corporate 
governance is, ‘How do suppliers of finance control managers?’. 
 
In this context it is useful to enquire what would be the economists' a priori 
expectations about how DC firms would finance their growth; to what extent 
would they use external rather than internal finance; how would their financing 
patterns differ from those for advanced country firms. Economic analysis would 
suggest that DC firms, operating as they do in under-developed and imperfect 
capital markets, may be obliged to finance most of their growth from internal 
cash flow, i.e. retained profits. Moreover one would expect them to have little 
recourse, if any, to the stock market to finance their investment projects. This is 
due to three reasons. First, because of the informational and regulatory 
shortcomings of emerging stock markets, as well as the fact that as many firms 
in these markets will not have established market reputations, the pricing 
process is likely to be noisy and arbitrary (Tirole, 1991). One result would be 
considerable share price volatility especially compared with that in more 
mature markets. This volatility would tend to discourage firms from attempting 
to raise funds by new issues. Secondly share price volatility reduces the 
efficiency of market signals and that may also be expected to discourage risk-
averse investors from raising funds, and indeed even from securing listings, on 
the stock market. Thirdly, as evidence suggests that typically large corporations 
in DCs are family-owned and controlled
15, this may be expected to make them 
more reluctant to issue equity for fear of losing control of the corporation. 
These and other similar considerations suggest two important empirical 
hypotheses.  The first is that DC firms may be expected to follow the typical 
'pecking-order' pattern of finance that, for other reasons the finance theory 
suggests, may characterize AC corporations.  According to this theory of a 
hierarchy of sources of finance, firms normally rely heavily on internal cash 
flow to finance their investment needs.  To the extent that they require further 
 resources, they resort first to bank borrowings and long-term debt, and only as a 
last recourse go to the stock market to raise funds.
16  Returning to the case of 
DC firms, the second prediction from the previous sequence of reasoning is that 
as many risk-averse deserving corporations may shun stock market altogether, 
the listings on the DC markets will, cetris paribus, tend to be quite low, 
especially compared with the AC markets. 
 
Myers and Majluf’s (1984) classic paper attributed the pecking order for AC 
corporations essentially to asymmetric information between managers and 
outside investors.  DC corporations are, of course, subject to the same kind of 
asymmetric information as their counterparts in ACs.  There are, however, 
additional reasons above to expect, in the case of the former group, the greater 
use of internal finance and less resort to external finance, particularly to the 
issuance of new shares on the stock market.  To sum up, if there are good 
reasons to expect a pecking order pattern of finance for corporate growth in 
ACs, there are even better a priori reasons to expect such a pattern in emerging 
markets. 
 
With respect to empirical evidence on these issues, two of the first large scale 
studies of the financing of corporate growth in emerging markets were Singh 
and Hamid (1992) and Singh (1995a).  The two studies arrived at surprising 
conclusions. The results indicated a comprehensive rejection of the pecking-
order theory for the average large DC corporation in their samples of normally 
the hundred largest quoted manufacturing firms in ten leading emerging 
economies. This research suggested that contrary to the analytical 
considerations outlined in the previous paragraphs, in order to finance their 
growth the large DC corporations: (a) relied much more on external than on 
internal finance and (b) among the external sources of funds they used new 
share issues to a surprisingly large degree. It was also found that there was a 
very fast growth of stock market listings in many DCs in the 1980s, again in 
contradiction to the theoretical expectation outlined above.
17 These empirical 
results led Schleifer and Vishny (1997) to ask: how can firms raise equity 
finance in countries with virtually no protection of minority investors, even if 
these countries are rapidly growing? 
 
Singh (1995a) outlined a theory to explain these anomalous findings in terms of 
the special circumstances of the 1980s (including the role of the DC 
governments in stimulating stock market growth to facilitate privatization; 
external and internal financial liberalization which often led both to a stock 
market boom and to higher interest rates, thus lowering the cost of equity 
capital relative to that of bank finance).  An implication of this theory was that 
 once this conjuncture of events is over, DC corporations will go back to the 
expected pecking order pattern of financing. Gugler, Mueller and Yurtoglu 
(2002) present a much more sophisticated theory to explain these anomalies. 
The main explanatory variable in their analysis, as indicated earlier, is the 
efficiency of corporate governance mechanisms in various countries. This 
framework also enables them to provide answers to other similar puzzles in the 
literature, including the classic question, why do investments out of different 
sources of finance earn different rates of return? 
 
IV. Product Market Competition in Emerging Markets 
Despite the policy importance and analytical significance of product market 
competition outlined in Sections I and II respectively, there are surprisingly few 
systematic empirical studies on this subject for DCs. Comparable data on three 
or four-firm concentration ratios are readily available only for a few countries 
and even that kind of basic information tends to be dated. 
 
In the absence of hard evidence, there are divergent opinions about the nature 
and degree of competition found in DC product markets.  Laffont (1998) 
suggests for example, that these markets tend to be small and segmented and 
suffer from a variety of imperfections.  Many developing countries do not have 
any anti-trust or anti-monopoly legislation at all.  Even when such legislation 
exists, governments are not always able to enforce it.  Further, governments 
often subsidize large firms to develop national champions and thereby affect 
market structure, firm behaviour and performance in distortionary ways. In 
many countries, governments tend to discourage entry through bureaucratic 
regulations and similarly block exit to maintain employment [De Soto, 1990; 
Tybout, 2000]. 
 
With respect to the more advanced semi-industrial economies, such as Korea, 
India or Brazil, it is generally believed that their manufacturing sectors are 
dominated by large corporations and consequently tend to be monopolistic. 
Some available cross country evidence on three or four-firm concentration 
ratios for leading emerging markets provides some support for this view. For 
example, the average three-firm concentration ratio for Japan in 1980 was 56%; 
the corresponding figures for Korea in 1981 and for Taiwan also in 1981 were 
62% and 49% respectively. Similarly, the average four-firm concentration 
ratios were recorded as being 43% in Argentina in 1984, 51% in Brazil in 1980, 
67% in Turkey in 1976, compared with 40% in the US in 1972 (World Bank 
1993). 
 
 There is however, also contrary evidence which indicates that many of these 
countries have a dualistic industrial structure with a substantial small firm 
sector existing side by side with the modern sector of large domestically owned 
conglomerate firms, as well as multinational corporations. Thus we find 
whereas small enterprises (employing less than ten workers) contribute only 
about 4 per cent of total employment in the US, their share in the DCs is many 
times larger. Enterprises with less than five workers account for 42 per cent of 
total employment in India, 56 per cent in Ghana, 84 per cent in Kenya, and 77 
per cent in Indonesia (Tybout, 2000). If the informal sector were included in 
these statistics, the contrast between the US industrial structure and that of DCs 
would be even sharper.
18 It remains, however, an open empirical question and 
an important subject for further research as to how much competition this vast 
small-scale sector brings to the large conglomerate firms in DCs.  Or is it the 
case that most competition for these large modern sector firms comes only from 
imports or multinationals rather than from small firms? 
 
A number of other scholars and policy makers, however, believe that despite 
extensive government involvement and guidance of corporate activities, and 
often weak enforcement of anti-trust laws, the domestic markets of many 
leading DC's are highly competitive.  Thus World Bank (1993) in its seminal 
study of the East Asian miracle economies: 
 
“Even though Japan and Korea have tended to have high levels of 
concentration in their manufacturing sector … , domestic competition has 
usually been vigorous.  The Japanese government has proceeded on the 
assumption that competition among fewer, more evenly matched firms is 
preferable to having one large firm competing with many smaller rivals, a 
principle that is well-recognized in athletic competitions (Nalebuff and Stiglitz 
(1983))." 
 
It is suggested that this competition is not always market-based but may be 
“contest-based”.  World Bank (1993) notes: 
 
“(East Asian Miracle Economies) developed institutional structures in which 
firms competed for valued economic prizes, such as access to credit, in some 
dimensions while actively cooperating in others; in short, they created 
contests.” 
 
Porter (1990) endorses this characterization of the intensity of competition in 
Korea and Japan.  In relation to Korea, for example, on the basis of detailed 
empirical studies of several industries, he suggests that Korean conglomerates 
 compete with each other far more than do the giant firms in most other 
countries.  Indeed, Porter ascribes the outstanding success of the Korean 
economy to the high degree of competition among the large oligopolistic firms, 
though, as indicated in Section I, a number of economists attribute the crisis in 
Korea and other Asian countries, to the poor competitive environment and a 
disregard for profits in corporate decisions. 
 
It is important to note that the comparative data reported in the previous 
paragraphs on the market structures of the US and Japan relative to that of DCs 
provides only static measures of concentration. These are widely acknowledged 
to be an inadequate guide to the relative extent of competition in an industry or 
a country. The static indicators need to be supplemented by dynamic measures 
of the competition process. This is done in this Policy Feature in papers by 
Glen, Lee and Singh and by Aw, Chung and Roberts.  The former use the PP 
methodology to assess intensity of competition between ACs and DCs and 
between the DCs themselves. They argue in detail that their counterintuitive 
result that competition is at least as severe, if not more so, in DCs as in ACs, is 
fully plausible in economic terms. One of their essential points is that just as 
there are anti-competition structural factors in DCs (of the kind outlined 
above), there are also a number of pro-competition structural forces present, 
notably, the low sunk costs of entry. The authors' analysis suggests that for any 
particular DC the balance of pro and anti competition forces can be affected by 
economic policy, which may not always be against competition. 
 
The paper by Aw, Chung and Roberts uses the different methodology of 
turnover and mobility (TM) studies to measure differences in the nature and 
intensity of competition between South Korea and Taiwan. Their analysis 
highlights the role of sunk costs of entry as the main determinant of the 
differences in competition dynamics between the two countries. Although Glen, 
Lee and Singh’s paper employs in its main empirical work the PP methodology, 
it also appeals to concepts and evidence from TM studies in defense of its 
claims concerning the relative intensity of competition dynamics in DCs and 
ACs. Specifically, the concept of low sunk costs of entry in DCs compared with 
ACs is regarded by the authors as one of the main reasons for their 
counterintuitive result. Glen, Lee and Singh also use comparative evidence for 
ACs and DCs on turnover (entry and exit of firms) and mobility (the expansion 
and decline of surviving firms) to support their conclusions. 
 
Apart from these conceptual and empirical links between the Glen, Lee and 
Singh and the Aw, Chung and Roberts papers, there is also a deeper connection 
between them at the methodological level. Despite the fact the PP and TM 
 studies use very different concepts and are empirically employed in very 
different ways, they do share a common intellectual ancestry.  They may both 
be regarded as part of a broader research programme on stochastic modelling of 
firm performance and market evolution over time.
19 The main basis of PP 
studies is usually regarded to be the Schumpeterian theory of “creative 
destruction" through competition.
20  The Schumpeterian vision is that of a 
competitive economic system in which there is an incessant stream of 
innovations - new products, new ways of organizing production and new means 
of production. Firms may gain temporary advantage through innovation-
induced positive shocks, or by lucky chance, but these will be quickly eroded 
by competitors, through new entry or exit of firms, or through the expansion or 
contraction of surviving firms. The latter are part and parcel of the 
Schumpeterian selection processes through which creative destruction takes 
place; these are explicitly examined in TM studies.
21 As Aw, Chung and 
Roberts note, the modern theoretical literature in which these latter type of 
studies are rooted are Jovanovic (1982), Lambson (1991), Hopenhayn (1992), 
and Ericson and Pakes (1995). The PP studies are not incompatible with the 
perspective of these contributions, although the former do not necessarily 
originate in the latter.
22 Both types of studies are compatible with either the 
Nelson and Winter (1982) evolutionary modelling of entry, growth and exit of 
firms or with solving stochastic dynamic optimization problems by managers 
who have rational expectations but limited information (See further Tybout, 
2000, Nelson and Winter, 2002).  
 
There also exists an important conceptual connection between TM studies and 
those of corporate governance, which is of a different kind than the theoretical 
links between competition and corporate governance considered earlier. This 
connection is highly significant at an empirical level and concerns the role of 
the takeover mechanism in the selection process. As most disappearances of 
firms quoted on stock markets have occurred through takeovers during the last 
half century in the U.S. as well as the U.K, this process should be central to TM 
studies. It clearly constitutes an integral part of both the exit of firms and the 
mobility of surviving firms through restructuring. Moreover, it is significant 
that the emergence of takeovers and mergers as the dominant cause of death of 
quoted firms is only a phenomenon of the post-World War Two period, both in 
the US and the UK. Hart and Prais’ (1956) classic paper suggested that between 
1880 and 1950 only about one third of the disappearances of quoted firms on 
the London stock market were due to amalgamations, while liquidations 
accounted for 40%.  However, while the question of takeovers now being the 
predominant cause of firm disappearances has been closely studied from the 
perspective of corporate governance and the efficiency of the market for 
 corporate control, it has generally received much less attention in TM studies. 
The latter research does examine, inter alia, changes in control of enterprises, 
but does so usually only at plant level and not at firm level.  It is important that 
the results based on plant-level data from TM studies on control changes should 
be reconciled with the analysis of takeovers in the corporate governance 
literature which is invariably based on firm-level data.  Caves (1998) suggests a 
reconciliation in terms of the theory of job-matching. This is a plausible 
hypothesis which needs to be explored in future research.
23 
 
V. Competition, Corporate Governance and Long-Term Economic 
Development: Issues for Research 
The two papers on product market competition and selection processes (Glen, 
Lee and Singh and Aw, Chung and Roberts) focus on the important prior 
questions concerning the measurement of the comparative intensity of 
competition in DCs; they do not consider the further substantial issue of the 
relationship between competition and long-term economic development. 
Similarly, the paper by Gugler, Mueller and Yurtoglu examines the means of 
identifying the quality of corporate governance systems and relates these to the 
micro-economic performance of firms in terms of their stock market returns.  
However, this paper also does not consider the further question of the nature of 
the relationship between corporate governance and long-term economic 
development or that between the micro-economic performance of individual 
firms and the aggregate outcomes in terms of the long-term growth of 
production and productivity. 
 
These issues are, of course, tremendously important analytically as well as from 
a policy perspective for DCs. However, they are very difficult to model and are 
subjects of great controversy even in ACs. In relation to competition, Nickell 
(1996) notes that economists are predisposed towards the view that competition 
enhances long-term economic growth and productivity growth. Such a case, he 
argues, is difficult to sustain in theoretical terms, particularly in the context of 
modern corporations with separation of ownership and control.
24 Although his 
own econometric study supports the positive case for competition, he suggests “ 
… the broad-brush evidence from Eastern Europe and Japan is, if anything, 
more persuasive than any detailed econometric evidence.” (p.741.)  Thus, he 
finds that qualitative and impressionistic evidence concerning Japan (high   
level of competition and fast economic growth) and that relating to Communist 
Eastern Europe (lack of competition and lack of dynamism) prove to be the best 




 It is important to take broad-brush evidence seriously, whether or not it is 
always more persuasive than detailed econometric studies. This is for the 
following reasons: first, in the absence of more detailed empirical analyses, 
such evidence is likely to form the basis of economic policy; second, at an 
academic level, it helps us formulate appropriate hypotheses for further 
investigation; and third, there is often a creative tension between the two kinds 
of evidence, investigation of which may lead to further development of the 
subject. In that spirit, it may be observed that although Nickell is right in his 
broad-brush characterization of Eastern Europe, his similar analysis of Japan 
needs to be seriously qualified. During its period of high economic growth 
(1950-1973) when Japan was more like a DC, the government implemented 
selective import controls; fostered close relationships between government, 
business and finance and helped co-ordinate investment decisions of firms; 
imported technology from abroad by other means while discouraging foreign 
investment. Instead of the dictum “the more competition the better”, the 
government strove to attain an optimum degree of co-operation and 
competition. During this period there was weak implementation of the anti-trust 
laws and the industrial policy interests of the Ministry of International Trade 




The experience of other East Asian countries, particularly Korea, has been 
broadly similar to that of Japan. As World Bank (1993) in its important study of 
the East Asian miracle countries, including Japan acknowledged these countries 
did not have unrestricted competition in product, capital and labour markets.
27 
The experience of China, which for the last two decades has had one of the 
fastest growth rates in the world, is also consistent with the East Asian story of 
unfettered competition being not necessarily optimal for fast economic growth. 
The Chinese economy has been able to register double-digit growth rates over a 
long period despite its segmented product markets and highly imperfect capital 
and labour markets. Overall, in the light of the experience of Japan, China and 
other East Asian countries, as well as that of the erstwhile socialist countries in 
Eastern Europe, the following conclusions would seem to be warranted: some 
competition is better than no competition; unfettered competition is not 
necessarily optimal; nations with highly imperfect markets can achieve fast 
long-term economic growth and many economically successful countries have 
followed policies which combine competition with purposive co-operation. 
 
Although this combination of co-operation and competition has worked very 
well under government guidance in East Asia, China and elsewhere in the 
developing world, it has also evidently failed in many developing countries. 
 Amsden (2000) suggests that a key factor is that successful countries have been 
able to build institutions which allow for governmental autonomy, permitting 
the state to impose socially necessary performance standards on corporations in 
return for its assistance.
28 
 
Most of the above conclusions also find support in Carlin, Haskel and 
Seabright (2001b), an important large empirical study on the experience of the 
market economy and restructuring in Eastern Europe and Russia during the last 
decade. This research is based on both survey evidence and econometric 
analysis. One of its main results is that, controlling for other relevant variables, 
there is a non-monotonic relationship between competition and economic 
performance.  The authors find that sales and productivity growth were higher 
in firms facing between one and three competitors in the market for their main 
product than in firms that either faced no competition at all or that faced more 
than three competitors. Thus the optimum level of competition does not appear 
to be zero or maximum competition. 
 
In this context, Aw, Chung and Roberts’ paper in this volume is highly 
instructive in that it compares systematically two of the world’s most successful 
developing countries with regard to their competition dynamics in the product 
markets. The authors’ finding that Taiwan has a greater intensity of competition 
than Korea in almost all dimensions (normally used in TM studies) raises the 
important question as to why the rate of long-term economic growth in these 
two countries has been broadly similar. Arguably, the answer may be that 
Korea’s ‘competition deficits’ were compensated for by the close relationship 
between government and business and its vigorous industrial policy.
29  Such 
issues merit more research. 
 
Similarly, Gugler, Mueller and Yurtoglu’s paper suggests that improved 
corporate governance and supporting institutions would lead to better economic 
performance. They identify basic protection of property rights, law and order, a 
well-functioning judicial system and contract enforcement as being among the 
crucial elements of good governance. But here, however, there is some broad-
brush evidence to the contrary which should not be ignored. In China there are 
acknowledged to be serious shortcomings from the conventional perspective of 
good corporate governance in terms of the legal system, in contract 
enforcement and in the definition of property rights.
30 Clearly, although the 
country has hardly been a model of corporate governance, it has been 
outstandingly successful in terms of long-term economic growth. This suggests 
that there are other factors, which may more than compensate for poor 
corporate governance. The evidence is also compatible with the notion that 
 corporate governance does not affect long-term growth or that there is more 
than one system of corporate governance that is conducive to economic growth, 
depending on a country’s history and its other institutions. Such differing 
hypotheses on these issues require systematic theoretical and empirical 
research. 
 
To sum up, the papers in this Policy Feature shed light on some of the basic 
prior questions about competition, selection and corporate governance in DCs. 
This overview has provided both the intellectual and policy background to the 
issues raised in these papers and has examined their interrelationships in 
empirical, analytical and methodological terms. In view of the relatively little 
research for DCs on these matters and of their immediate national and 
international policy significance they present themselves as prime candidates 
for further research. These include issues such as the relationship between 
corporate governance and long-term economic development - specifically, 
whether there exists more than one form of  corporate governance which is 
conducive to long-term growth; national and comparative studies on the state of 
competition in its various dimensions for DCs; the appropriate combination of 
co-operation and competition to achieve maximum social welfare in countries 
at different levels of development;
31 the question of dualism in the industrial 
structure of developing countries and the relationship between large and small 
firms in these countries; issues concerning the kinds of domestic competition 
policy which would be most appropriate for DCs, and, bearing in mind the 
changing nature of the relationships between multinational firms, DC 
governments and domestic firms, what sort of international competition policy 
should be formulated to promote the development potential of DCs;
32 and the 
major issue of  the relationship between corporate finance, corporate 
governance and long-term economic growth. This constitutes a formidable and 
exciting research agenda for students of emerging markets. 
 
The analysis of these issues would have direct policy implications for emerging 
markets as well as for the management of the international economy.  Judging 
by the examples of the theoretical and empirical anomalies revealed and 
resolved in the papers in this Feature and the new ones which emerge from 
them, this research programme is also bound to have broader analytical 
significance for economic theory - particularly the theory of the firm,
33 the 






1 For differing perspectives on the causes, consequences and remedies of the 
financial crisis in East Asian countries, see three recent collections of 
articles published by National Bureau of Economic Research: Feldstein 
(2002), Dooley and Frankel (2002), Edwards and Frankel (2002). For 
contributions which specifically attribute the crisis to the Asian model of 
capitalism see for example Greenspan (1998), Summers (1998, 2000), 
Frankel (1998), Phelps (1999), Johnson et al (2000a, 2000b).  See also 
IMF (1997,1998) and the US Council for Economic Advisers (1998, 
1999). 
2 Johnson et al. (2000a) argue that measures of corporate governance and in 
particular the effectiveness of protection for minority shareholders, 
explain the extent of the exchange rate depreciation and stock market 
decline in the Asian crisis countries better than standard macroeconomic 
indicators. 
3 For an implicit or explicit critique of the structuralist thesis see Chang (2000), 
Sakakibara (2001), Stiglitz (1999), Wade and Veneroso (1998), Sachs 
and Radelet (1998), Singh (1999a), Singh and Weisse (1999) and Jomo 
(2001). 
4 See Mullins (1993), Levine (1997) and Singh (1997, 1999b). 
5 For a discussion of the New International Financial Architecture (NIFA) (a) in 
relation to corporate governance, see Singh, Singh  and Weisse (2001), 
Iskander and Chamlou (2000); (b) in relation to competition and 
competition policy see Singh (2002) and World Bank (2002). On other 
aspects of NIFA  see the three NBER collections of articles referred to in 
footnote 1. 
6 The words ‘emerging markets’, ‘emerging countries’, and ‘developing 
countries’ are used inter-changeably throughout this paper. 
7 See, for example, Iskander and Chamlou (2000) for the new primary data on 
ownership collected by the World Bank.  See also Beck, Demirgue, and 
Levine (2000). 
8 See La Porta et al (1998, 2000a, 2000b), Claessens et al (2000), Levine and 
Zervos (1998). See also Rajan and Zingales (1998). 
9 The classical reference here is La Porta et. al. (1998). 
10 See further, Winter (1971, 1987), Stiglitz (1991), Singh (1992), Nelson and 
Winter (2002). 
11 See further Marris (1964), Meade (1968), Singh (1971). 
12 For the UK studies see Meeks (1977); Cosh, Hughes and Singh (1980), Cosh 
et al (1989, 1998); Frank and Mayer (1996), Dickerson (1997). For the 
  
 
US, see Schwarz (1982), Mueller (1980), Warshawsky (1987), 
Ravenscraft and Scherer (1989), Auerbach (1988). For review articles, 
see among others Hughes (1991), Singh (1992), (1993a), and Mueller 
(1992, 1997). 
13 Singh (1971, 1975); Greer (1986). 
14 See further Cosh, Hughes and Singh (1990) and Singh (2000). 
15 Claessens, Djankov and Lang (2000), Iskander and Chamlou (2000). 
16 Myers and Majluf (1984); Myers (2001) 
17 The mean quoted company in Singh’s sample of ten emerging markets during 
the 1980s financed more than 60% of its growth of net assets from 
external sources and only about 40% from internal sources, i.e. retained 
profits.  Among the external sources, again surprisingly, equity financing 
(40 percentage points) was relatively more significant than long-term 
debt (20 percentage points).  These were the average figures; in some 
countries the significance of external finance was considerably greater. 
Thus, for example, in South Korea nearly 80% of corporate growth came 
from external sources (nearly 50% equity and 30% long-term debt) and 
only about 20% from retained profits. For more recent figures on 
corporate financing patterns, see Singh, Singh and Weisse (2001).  For 
the controversy on empirical methodology, see Cobham and 
Subramaniam (1998), Singh and Weisse (1998), and Whittington, 
Saporta and Singh (1997). Further, contrary to a priori expectations, 
there was, during the 1980s, a large increase in listings on DC stock 
markets. By the early 1990s, India, admittedly an extreme case, had the 
distinction of having nearly 8,000 firms listed on its stock markets, and 
ranked just below the U.S. Its listings were several times larger than 
those of the European stock exchanges, even that of London. This 
anomaly also calls for an explanation.  Singh (1994, 1995a). 
18 Relative to advanced countries, the share of the small-scale sector in DCs in 
terms of employment would be larger than in terms of output because of 
the bigger differences in capital intensity of the two sectors in these 
countries.  Tybout (2000). 
19 See further Jovanovic (1982); Ericson and Pakes (1995); Geroski, Machin 
and Walters (1997), Pakes and Ericson (1998); and the recent review, 
Caves (1998). 
20 See Mueller (1990); Geroski (1990); and Carlin, Haskel and Seabright 
(2001a). 
21 See further Carlin, Haskel and Seabright (2001a). 
  
 
22 For a recent review article on TM studies and their relationship with other 
streams of thinking  in industrial organization, see Caves (1998). 
23 Although the takeovers process is at present less relevant to DCs than to 
ACs, it will nevertheless be interesting to examine what kind of control 
changes take place in plants in DCs and what differences exist between 
quoted and unquoted firms in this respect. 
24 See further Vickers (1994) and Willig (1987). 
25 Economic performance in Nickell’s (1996) econometric study is measured in 
terms of the level and the growth of firm productivity.  He does not 
address the question of the link between micro-level economic 
performance and long-term aggregate economic growth. 
26 See further Amsden and Singh (1994); Okimoto (1989). 
27 There is a vast literature on this subject. See, among others, Amsden (1989, 
2000); Wade (1990); Rodrik (1995); Singh (1995b). 
28 See  Rodrik (2000) who also emphasizes the importance of appropriate 
institutions for sustaining economic success. 
29 It will be recalled from Section 1 that, in the structuralist view, industrial 
policy may be regarded as one of the causes of the Korean crisis. This 
interpretation is, however, at variance with facts. Korea had abandoned 
industrial policy in the early 1990s following its decision to apply to 
become a member of the OECD. It even abolished its planning office in 
1993. The available evidence is more compatible with the alternative 
analysis that the crisis was caused mainly by other factors, including 
precipitate financial liberalization as well as the sudden reversal of 
international capital flows. See further references given in footnotes 1 
and 3 on different perspectives on the causes of the East Asian crisis. 
30 See, for example, Singh (1996), Lardy (1998), Jefferson, Mai and Zhao 
(1999), Chien-Hsun and Hui-Tzu (2001), Gabriele (2001), Nolan (2001). 
31 Not only is there support for this proposal in the historical experience of East 
Asian countries and China, but also in the experience of industrial 
districts in Italy and other countries. See Piore and Sabel (1984) and Best 
(1990). Further, recent theoretical developments in industrial 
organisation suggest that, in relation to innovation, “inter-firm 
coordination, even among horizontal competitors, can bring substantial 
welfare benefits. “ (Baumol, 2001, p.736.) 
32 These issues have acquired added significance in the light of the Doha 
Ministerial Decision to include competition policy as a part of the WTO 
work programme with a view to eventual multilateral negotiation.  See 
further Singh (2002). 
  
33 Aoki (1990) formalized the differences between Japanese and Anglo-Saxon 
firms to develop a distinct theory of the Japanese firm.  Singh, Singh and 
Weisse (2002) note in this context in relation to DCs the ubiquitousness 
of large, privately owned conglomerate business groups on all 
developing continents.  They further note the important differences 
between these DC groups and AC conglomerates both now and in the 
past.  These considerations suggest the need to explore the possibility of 
a distinct theory for large DC firms which is compatible with their known 
characteristics and their critical role in late industrialization. For a recent 
review of DC business groups, see further Khanna (2000). 
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